

## Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era

by Jeffrey Simon

### Key Points

**B**y the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will have enlarged to 26 countries, with 10 of the original 24 Partnership for Peace (PFP) partners having achieved full Alliance membership. This transition marks the end of an era and raises questions about PFP direction and long-term viability.

The original strategic rationale for the partnership, enhancing stability among and practical cooperation with the countries along the NATO periphery, has become even more compelling in the context of further Alliance enlargement, the war on terrorism, growing Western interests in Southwest and Central Asia, and the rise of authoritarian and neoimperialist sentiments in Russia. That said, the key incentive that once animated engagement in the partnership has been diminished since the remaining partners are either not interested in membership or unlikely to join for many years.

To retain its relevance and effectiveness, the Partnership for Peace must be transformed, adequately resourced, and better integrated with bilateral and regional efforts to address new security challenges. The Istanbul Summit could launch an initiative to promote new, tailored PFP programs in the Balkans, greater Black Sea region, and countries of Central Asia.

NATO should also link Balkan partner membership accession to the completion of specific NATO *acquis* with a time horizon of roughly 5 to 8 years and offer intensified dialogue with Ukraine as a prerequisite to initiating membership discussions.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced a strategic challenge: how to shape the post-Communist reform process in Central and Eastern Europe in ways that would foster stability and allow for cooperation on common security problems. NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 to promote dialogue on common security concerns with these countries and the former Soviet Union. The NACC dialogue bridged the former East-West divide and illuminated opportunities for practical cooperation. The council also helped Central and East European politicians understand that defense requirements are best rooted in democratic politics and that national security encompassed civil emergency planning and a broader range of concerns, not just the military.

### PFP Evolution

The Partnership for Peace (PFP), which built on the NACC, has undergone enormous change since it was launched in January 1994. The PFP was designed to allow for practical cooperation between NATO and nonmembers on a bilateral and multilateral basis and to prepare aspirants for entry into the Alliance, which was not *yet* ready to accept new members. Though many aspirants initially saw the partnership as a “policy for postponement,” it did address some of their security concerns and established the norm that partners should make contributions to common security.<sup>1</sup> Continued partner pressure for membership and political shifts in the West led NATO to initiate a *Study on NATO Enlargement* that made clear to all that the partnership was the best path to NATO membership.<sup>2</sup>

Within 6 months of launching PFP, there were roughly two dozen partners, including most of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. PFP architects wrestled to identify the most useful forms of cooperation and found military exercises and training generated great interest. Initially, about a dozen partners participated in the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium, to coordinate and plan military exercises for search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations. The PCC terms of reference expanded to include “peace enforcement operations” after the December 1995 Dayton Accords and the NATO decision to allow partners to deploy peacekeepers in the Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR)<sup>3</sup> and follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR).<sup>4</sup> Another focal point was internal defense reform—the so-called Planning and Review Process (PARP).<sup>5</sup>

The July 1997 Madrid Summit invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join the Alliance and “enhanced” the partnership to be more relevant and operational.<sup>6</sup> The summit also debuted the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced the NACC, and the creation of the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council and NATO–Ukraine Commission to enhance consultation and cooperation with Russia and Ukraine.

By the April 1999 Washington Summit, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland had just become the first PFP partners to join the Alliance, which was then heavily engaged in a bombing campaign of Serbia. In the follow-on Kosovo Force (KFOR), 16 PFP partners contributed to the operation,<sup>7</sup> in addition to the 3 new Allies. The summit approved the new Alliance Strategic Concept, which underscored the importance of partnerships and launched a

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Defense Capabilities Initiative to improve operability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between Alliance *and* partner forces in operations not falling under Article 5 (the collective defense provision of the Alliance). It approved a third PARP cycle that further enhanced partner force planning procedures to make them more closely resemble the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire.<sup>8</sup> The 1999 summit also introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as a visible manifestation of the NATO "Open Door" (Article 10) policy with a clear set of Allied expectations from prospective members.<sup>9</sup> The MAP Annual National Plans generated by the nine<sup>10</sup> aspirant partners would allow each to set its own objectives and targets on preparations for possible future membership. This framework and experience prepared the partnership well for the challenges of the war on terrorism.

## Post-9/11 Challenges

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, NATO and many partner governments have struggled, with varying degrees of success, to reshape their defense capabilities to deal with the new risks posed by global terrorism. In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States increased defense expenditures by \$48 billion (a sum equal to the entire defense budget of the United Kingdom). In contrast, the defense budgets of most other longtime Allies have remained unchanged and the overall capabilities gap between America and other Allies has widened further since the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Yet in the aftermath of 9/11, NATO committed itself to a broader functional and wider geographic area of engagement. After invoking Article 5 on collective defense on September 12, NATO airborne warning and control systems flew over the United States while its naval forces operated in the eastern Mediterranean.

Still, as NATO began to "plan" operations in and around Afghanistan, PFP demonstrated its utility in bolstering and facilitating NATO operations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Moreover, at their first meeting after the 9/11 attacks, EAPC defense ministers affirmed their determination to utilize the partnership to increase cooperation and capabilities against

terrorism. Consistent with the NATO realization that it must place greater emphasis on meeting the challenges of asymmetric warfare, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council approved new PARP ministerial guidance<sup>11</sup> and adopted an Action Plan 2002–2004 and the Civil Emergency Action Plan regarding possible chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) attacks.

Although the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan commenced in January 2002 with the participation of several Allies and PFP partners, NATO did not assume command until April 16, 2003.<sup>12</sup> In addition, many Allies (to include two new ones—Poland and the Czech Republic) and six PFP partners<sup>13</sup> rendered substantial assistance in Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan. Finally, after Saddam Hussein was toppled in Iraq, NATO provided intelligence and logistical support to the Polish-led multinational division,<sup>14</sup> comprised of many Allies and 11 partners, which is engaged in stabilization efforts as part of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.<sup>15</sup> It would not be beyond imagination that NATO *might* assume command of the Polish division sector at some point. Allies and partners are likely to be engaged in these areas for years to come.

To better address these challenges, the November 2002 Prague Summit approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment, NATO Response Force, and new NATO command structure. Its centerpiece is the creation of the small NATO Response Force with high-tech capabilities for expeditionary missions that would allow European Allies and partners to contribute small niche units (for example, police, engineering, de-mining, chemical decontamination, alpine, and special forces) with secure communications, ample readiness, and the capability to deploy, sustain, and operate with U.S. forces through the entire conflict spectrum. If implemented, these initiatives would provide a more constructive burdensharing arrangement for NATO in the post-9/11 risk environment.

The Prague Summit also endorsed the military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism that calls for "improved intelligence sharing and crisis response arrangements [and commitment with partners] to fully implement the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action

Plan . . . against possible attacks by . . . chemical, biological or radiological agents."<sup>16</sup> So, too, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council adopted the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism on November 22, 2002, which commits partners to take steps to combat terrorism at home and share information and experience.<sup>17</sup> Although this plan has not yet achieved very much, it does establish a framework upon which to build necessary functions.

## A Vision for PFP Revival

To keep the Partnership for Peace relevant and effective over the next decade, partners need to focus on developing capabilities to combat terrorism and other transnational threats. New programs could focus on making interior ministries, police, and border guards more effective. A revived partnership needs to improve its intelligence cooperation to include sharing of interior (police and border control) and finance information. Finally, the PFP budget and functions need to be reexamined and updated to support future counterterrorist operations to include the counterproliferation efforts and missile defense systems outlined in the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism.

Added to these broader functional and wider geographic challenges facing the Alliance, the relationship between NATO members and PFP partners is changing dramatically. With 7 MAP partners acceding to membership in 2004, there will soon be more Allies (26) than partners (20)—including Russia and Ukraine, who, while PFP members, have special bilateral relationships with NATO. Allies will be struggling with the transformation of their own armed forces and security sector institutions and with completing the integration of the 10 newest members. The 20 remaining partners have diverse security interests, and the majority of them have much weaker defense establishments and governmental institutions than those joining the Alliance.

Given this context, the Istanbul Summit should articulate a new strategic vision for the partnership to ensure its ability to support NATO commitments to a wider geographic area and broader functional engagement. The summit will mark 10 years since the inception of the Partnership for Peace, and 10 partners will have joined the Alliance. During this period, many subregional partnerships and regional groupings have emerged and contributed substantially to confidence, stability,

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and security. A revived partnership needs to build on and help extend the benefits of this subregional cooperation.

But for NATO to succeed in reenergizing the PFP at the Istanbul Summit, the partnership will need to be tailored to the security concerns and interests of the remaining 20 NATO partners and 2 PFP aspirants (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro) who fall into the following 8 distinct groups with very diverse needs, interests, and capacities:

- 5 “advanced” partners—Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland—with no interest yet in joining the Alliance

- 3 MAP partners—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—who do aspire to membership and for whom NATO must keep its Open Door “credible”

- 2 Balkan PFP aspirants—Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro

- 3 Caucasus partners—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

- 5 Central Asia partners—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan

- 2 relatively inactive partners—Belarus and Moldova

- Ukraine, which claims to be an aspirant with an “Action Plan” and hopes to join the Membership Action Plan

- Russia, which does not aspire to membership but maintains a special relationship in the NATO–Russia Council established in May 2002.

The incentives for PFP participation vary widely. Russia, which is not interested in formal membership, and Ukraine, which aspires to join NATO, are special cases. While Moldova and Belarus remain relatively inactive in the partnership, their role could change as they adjust to their altered geostrategic environment after enlargement. The partnership also provides incentive for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro because it remains their one near-term pathway to Euro-Atlantic structures and legitimacy. So, too, the remaining 16 PFP partners, who fall into 4 categories, are likely to embrace a reenergized PFP.

*Advanced Partners.* All of the five advanced partners<sup>18</sup> (except Switzerland) are already in the European Union (EU) and remain outside formal NATO membership by choice. Their increased participation in the PFP in recent years has focused primarily on the Balkans and serves as an example of partnership participation as being important in its own right and *not* necessarily being a route to membership. These partners (along with NATO

members) should be encouraged to establish a “buddy” system with Caucasian and Central Asian partners (as Sweden and Finland have already done with the Baltic states and similar to what Lithuania has been doing with Georgia). This may not be easy, as the advanced partners have been more active in local Baltic cooperation and Balkan peace support operations that have been inexorably shifting to the European Union.<sup>19</sup> Hence, it will be a challenge to keep these partners engaged in wider NATO geographic interests. One way to engage them might be to make preparation of NATO exercises in the Caucasus and Central Asia more flexible, allow the nonaligned partners to take a greater part in their planning, and encourage their security sector expertise in a revived partnership.

*Balkan Stability and Security.* NATO enlargement, the MAP process, and Partnership for Peace have played a very important but underappreciated role in enhancing Balkan stability and security. Slovenian, Bulgarian, and Romanian membership in NATO forms a stable security foundation. The MAP (as long as the Open Door policy remains credible) keeps Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia positively engaged in activities consistent with NATO principles, and the incentive of PFP membership keeps Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro productively focused. Their continued successful engagement has become increasingly important in light of the transfer of the NATO Operation *Allied Harmony* in Macedonia to the European Union (*Concordia*) and will become even more important after the likely transfer of the Dayton implementation missions conducted by NATO SFOR to the European Union later in 2004.

If PFP were to become moribund or lose credibility, Balkan security would be severely undermined because some nations might be tempted to move in unconstructive directions.

With this in mind, the Istanbul Summit could establish more precise goals that need to be achieved in order to keep the NATO Open Door credible for the three remaining MAP members, particularly Albania and Macedonia, which have been in the partnership for almost a decade.<sup>20</sup> If NATO is unprepared to offer membership soon to these countries, it needs to establish the *prospect* of it. NATO might consider some version of a “regatta concept” linking Balkan MAP partner accession to the completion of specific, well-defined NATO *acquis* built into the MAP Annual National

Plans and with a notional time horizon of roughly 5 to 8 years.<sup>21</sup> While the regatta concept was rejected for the 2002 Prague Summit invitees because member governments wanted to keep membership a political decision rather than linking it to completion of fixed criteria, it may be the only way to maintain interest in the partnership among these three countries still recovering from recent conflicts. PFP programs should be coordinated with EU assistance to security sector reforms to tackle the new security threats outlined in the EAPC Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism.

PFP programs need to be better integrated with the successful subregional Southeast European Defense Ministerials (SEDM) process (which should also be broadened to include interior and intelligence functions), the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to combat transborder crime, and the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) in the Balkans. If this proves difficult *in* the Balkans (as it likely will beyond), then the PFP mandate, consistent with the Prague Summit Action Plan Against Terrorism, *ought* to be broadened to include Partnership Goals with police activities as it already has been with border guards. The objective is the improvement of interagency coordination and cooperation within and among Balkan states.

This integration could be accomplished within the annual SEDM meetings that began in 1996<sup>22</sup> and have succeeded in enhancing transparency and building cooperation and security in Southeastern Europe. In 1999, the Southeast European Defense Ministerials approved the creation of the Southeast European Brigade that comprises a 25,000-troop force that can be assembled as needed by brigade commanders. There is speculation that the SEEBRIG *might* be deployed to Bosnia sometime in the future.

It is now time to build further upon SEDM successes to deal with the new risk environment consistent with NATO guidance. The Southeast European Defense Ministerials should be broadened to include civil emergency planning and interior and intelligence ministers to become an annual Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial (SEDIIM). The new SEDIIM should be encouraged to coordinate further its work with the SECI,<sup>23</sup> which broadened its activities in October 2000 to combat transborder crime involving trafficking of drugs and weapons, prostitution, and money laundering. Since Moldova,



Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina are SECI members and the latter two are also PFP aspirants, they should all become SEDM observers, with the goal of ultimate membership in the broadened SEDIIM process.

Balkan stability can be maintained and security further enhanced by fine-tuning the Partnership for Peace and MAP process to keep the program credible and members and aspirants engaged, coupling PFP goals to a broadened functional SEDIIM and SECI with a more inclusive participation by initially extending observer status to Moldova, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

*Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Caucasian Partners.* The greater Black Sea region has acquired increased strategic importance to NATO in recent years, particularly since the Alliance assumed ISAF command in Afghanistan and support of the Polish-led division in Iraq. However, regional security dialogue and cooperation have been complicated by lingering disputes, weak governance, and other problems. While there has been dialogue on economic cooperation in the region, Black Sea defense ministers have *never* met. It is time to apply the successful lessons of security cooperation in Central and Southeast Europe to the greater Black Sea region. The first step to regional stabilization is to build understanding through discussion of security risks and then to build greater cooperation through implementation of military activities in support of a transparent agenda. What options should the participants consider?

The successful Balkan cooperation initiatives—SEDM (and potential SEDIIM), SECI, and SEEBRIG—could serve as models for the Caucasus and also extend their benefits throughout the greater Black Sea littoral.

The Central and East European experience since the late 1980s provides several successful examples of using military cooperation to build confidence and regional security among wary neighbors that could be applied to improve interstate relations in the greater Black Sea region. These include Romania-Hungary military contacts to improve otherwise cool political relations in the early 1990s; the continued deployment of the Czech-Slovak battalion in the United Nations (UN) Protection Force and UN Command Humanitarian Relief Operation during and after the January 1993 “velvet divorce”; the Polish-Ukraine Battalion in Kosovo (and now Iraq); and the formation

of the Baltic Battalion and SEEBRIG to foster regional cooperation in the Baltics and Balkans. Adapting some of these experiences as models for application within the Caucasus and with the three new Black Sea Allies (after 2004) and partners and other willing Allies (coupled with a U.S. Black Sea presence), under a revived PFP, could go a long way in advancing greater Black Sea cooperation and stability and NATO security interests.

There are some foundations upon which to build security cooperation in this region. Six Black Sea littoral states established the Black

### **the successful Balkan cooperation initiatives could serve as models for the Caucasus**

Sea Force in April 2001 for search and rescue operations, mine clearance, environmental protection, and promotion of goodwill visits by naval forces.<sup>24</sup> One can envision the creation of a Black Sea Task Force to deal not only with civil emergency contingencies, such as the earthquakes that perennially strike the region or potential CBR incidents, but also to interdict the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans, particularly if Ukraine and Russia participated.

Since the continued engagement of Ukraine in the partnership is important, the Istanbul Summit might consider commencing intensified dialogues with Ukraine as a prerequisite to joining the MAP, assuming Ukraine’s presidential elections are held as scheduled in October 2004 in accordance with standards set by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and adhere to Ukrainian constitutional procedures.

In addition to interstate cooperation, U.S. policy can help improve Black Sea cooperation and stability. The likely new U.S. presence in Bulgaria and Romania can be leveraged to improve interoperability through development of joint training and logistics facilities and to build a joint expeditionary Black Sea Task Force. Coupled with Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey—now the three Black Sea Allies with a rich experience in SEDM and SEEBRIG—the U.S. presence could be beneficial in fostering wider Black Sea cooperation under a revived PFP program.

Although all three Caucasus partners were PFP signatories in 1994, their participation has varied considerably and only recently has

become more prominent. This has been particularly evident with the PARP, which remains the core of transparent defense planning, accountability, and democratic oversight of the military, and provides the foundation to enhance subregional cooperation. After 9/11, all three Caucasus partners joined the PARP.

Though Armenia participates in the Partnership for Peace, cooperation with NATO remains controversial because of unresolved problems with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia has good relations with Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania and remains very close to Russia. An original signatory of the May 15, 1992, Tashkent Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty with Russia, Armenia was the only Caucasus state which renewed its commitment for another 5 years on April 2, 1999.

While Azerbaijan and Georgia signed the CIS treaty in 1993, they withdrew from it in April 1999. Azerbaijan’s principal security concerns are its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and problems with terrorism, drugs, crime, and human trafficking. Azerbaijan cooperates with the United States in counterterrorism and participates in post-conflict efforts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Georgia participates in KFOR and Black Sea regional cooperation and wants NATO to play a role in solving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts on Georgian soil, and in September 2002, its parliament adopted a resolution endorsing the goal of NATO membership. The United States has assisted the Georgian armed forces through the Train and Equip Program and in establishing control over the Pankisi Gorge near the border with Russia.

The United States has greater influence among Caucasian (and Central Asian) partners than NATO (and EU) structures per se because the Alliance has been more hampered by what it can offer in terms of assistance.<sup>25</sup> But this could change *if* the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) was more directly focused on the region and the PFP Trust Fund was made more robust.

*Central Asian Partners.* While it was hoped that NACC and partnership participation by the Central Asian states would maintain their ties to the West and encourage democratic developments, the results have been mixed. PFP cooperation did facilitate NATO moves into Central Asia to support operations in Afghanistan in 2001; however,

the politics of the region remain largely authoritarian. Security cooperation was also complicated by the fact that four of the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) were among the original signatories of the CIS Collective Security Treaty with Russia and Armenia. When the protocol extending the treaty was signed on April 2, 1999, Uzbekistan dropped out of the treaty. Four of the Central Asian states were among the PFP signatories of 1994, but only after 9/11 did Tajikistan finally join. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also joined PARP in December 2001.

Though none of the Central Asian partners participated in any of the Balkan operations (IFOR, SFOR, or KFOR), they have supported U.S.- and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have provided basing rights and overflights for U.S. and coalition forces in Operation *Enduring Freedom*, and Kazakhstan supported Poland with de-mining troops in Iraq and permitted the overflight and transport of supplies and U.S. troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Increasingly, these activities have irritated the Russians. Hence, encouraging the active participation of Russia in a revived PFP, as well as consultations in the Russia–NATO Council, will be increasingly important to reduce the inevitable frictions and explore options for cooperative Russian engagement.

## Istanbul Initiatives

The foregoing analysis illustrates the increasing importance of effective cooperation with PFP partners to NATO ability to meet its wider geographic and functional needs. A revival of the partnership would also provide an opportunity to promote democratic governance, defense and security sector reforms, and sub-regional cooperation in the Greater Black Sea region and Central Asia, steps that will enhance long-term security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. While PFP must continue to adapt to the requirements of the post-9/11 era and a changing NATO membership, its original charter to promote good neighborly relations, democracy, free enterprise, equitable treatment of ethnic minorities, and democratic oversight and effective management of the armed forces has enduring value.

To give new momentum to the Partnership for Peace on departure from Istanbul, a

number of actions should be considered to ensure PFP vitality.

First, the United States and its Allies should devise a PFP strategy to link Balkan MAP partner accession to the completion of specific NATO *acquis* with a time horizon of roughly 5 to 8 years and offer intensified dialogues with Ukraine as a prerequisite to joining MAP.

Also, consistent with existing PFP guidance, the Southeast European Defense Ministerials should be broadened to include civil emergency planning and the participation of

## a revival of the partnership will enhance long-term security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region

interior and intelligence ministers to become an annual Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial; its cooperation with SECI should be encouraged; and the provision of observer status to Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia-Montenegro in the SEDIIM should be promoted.

Further, programs of subregional cooperation in Southeastern Europe could be adapted to or extended across the Black Sea. The United States and others could work with SEDM participants to sponsor the creation of a Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Black Sea Task Force to deal with civil emergency contingencies and interdiction of illegal trafficking.

An action that the United States should take is to announce its willingness to support a *new* Istanbul Initiative with roughly \$80 million to \$100 million to promote basic PFP objectives in the Balkans, greater Black Sea region, and Central Asia. The funds would support military education and training programs and broader security sector reforms, and provide the catalyst for promoting necessary subregional cooperation and institutional development. The United States should challenge other Allies to offer proportional funding, including support for Central and Eastern European members to transfer the lessons of their security sector transition to these other partners.

After the launch of PFP in 1994, when it became obvious that resources were lacking, the United States started its Warsaw Initiative with \$100 million in annual funding. By the 2004 Istanbul Summit, most of the Warsaw Initiative's key recipients will be members of the Alliance, with the program achieving

enormous success. But the remaining 20 partners, particularly around the greater Black Sea, in the Caucasus, and Central Asia, have significantly *weaker* political, economic, social, and security and defense institutions than the 10 partners who have become full NATO members. In addition, the challenges that these partners face, consistent with the post-9/11 broader civil emergency planning and counterterrorism direction taken by NATO since the Prague Summit, require *greater* assistance to bring their personnel and institutions closer to NATO standards.

The United States should support the new Istanbul Initiative with funding at roughly the same amount as the current Warsaw Initiative (Department of Defense share of \$40 million and Department of State Foreign Military Financing [FMF] share of \$40 million), to focus on a more sophisticated program stressing the basics. The Department of Defense share would be used to train and educate civilian and military partner personnel; assist in developing a rational partner military force that would be capable of cooperating with its border troops, police, and intelligence institutions; refine and develop civil emergency planning procedures that will be interoperable with immediate neighbors; and promote the development of a Greater Black Sea Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial to work with NATO and the United States. The Department of State FMF share should be used to upgrade air, ground, and sea facilities and build required infrastructure to support efforts such as the Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Greater Black Sea Task Force.

Several multilateral funding actions should also be taken. NATO must ensure that the PFP Trust Fund becomes more than a rhetorical commitment. The fund—which has allocated \$4.2 million to destroy antipersonnel mines in Albania, Ukraine, and Moldova, and dispose of missile stockpiles in Georgia—will be expanded.

The Alliance also needs to look at redirecting NATO infrastructure funds to improve the infrastructure and bases needed to support Alliance operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other potential remote deployments.

The NATO Security Investment Program has an annual budget of over \$600 million (\$681 million in 2004)<sup>26</sup> to cover installations and facilities dealing with communications and information systems, radar, military headquarters, airfields, fuel pipelines and storage,

harbors, and navigational aids. NSIP funds have also been used to cover eligible requirements for the NATO-led SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF peace support operations to include repair of airfields, rail, and roads.<sup>27</sup>

Since NATO has assumed the lead in the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force, NSIP funds now ought to be eligible for the ISAF operation and be applied to the broader Black Sea region to augment NATO air, road, and rail support. The Istanbul Summit should make NSIP funds eligible to improve facilities in PFP countries in direct support of ISAF and other remote operations.

The summit should also authorize the Secretary General to restructure the NATO International Staff yet again to consolidate the partnership in one directorate,<sup>28</sup> perhaps headed by its own assistant secretary general. This would symbolize Alliance commitment to a renewed partnership and highlight the enduring importance of the program.

Finally, NATO needs to engage the European Union and other institutions in coordinating assistance to these regions more effectively to help partners advance security sector reform, rule of law, and other capabilities that will enhance security and stability.

If the Istanbul Summit fails to give new momentum to the Partnership for Peace, there likely will be destabilizing consequences with implications throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, and NATO will find it increasingly difficult to fulfill its missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. A reenergized PFP can help NATO achieve its broader functional and geographic objectives.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> These occurred in the form of Individual Partnership Programs and self-differentiation. It marked the establishment of a wide environment of cooperation to include participation in the Planning and Review Process, peace support operations in the Partnership Coordination Cell, transparency, and democratic oversight of the military.

<sup>2</sup> The study, briefed to partners in 1995, incorporated the principles of political democracy, economic free enterprise, equitable treatment of ethnic minorities, good neighbor relations, and democratic oversight of the military as essential elements of being a producer of security into NATO *acquis*.

<sup>3</sup> The following 14 (of 26) PFP partners participated in the Implementation Force: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine.

<sup>4</sup> Later Ireland, Slovakia, and Slovenia also joined the Stabilization Force.

<sup>5</sup> The first PARP cycle launched in 1995 had 14 participants: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine. See Anthony Cragg, "The Partnership For Peace and Review Process," *NATO Review* 43, no. 6 (November 1995), 23–25.

<sup>6</sup> The second PARP cycle launched in October 1996, which introduced interoperability objectives to permit partner forces to operate with Allies, had 18 partners sign up.

<sup>7</sup> The 16 partners participating in KFOR included Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland; Russia and Ukraine; and Azerbaijan and Georgia from the Caucasus.

<sup>8</sup> In essence, Partnership Goals for Interoperability and for Forces and Capabilities would replace the old interoperability objectives in 2000. The new Partnership Goals aimed to develop specific armed forces and capabilities that partners could offer in support of NATO operations and permit partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council greater participation in deliberations involving exercise planning.

<sup>9</sup> MAP identified five partner areas (political/economic, defense/military, resources, security, and legal) that were necessary to develop the capabilities needed for membership.

<sup>10</sup> Croatia only joined the partnership after the Washington Summit on May 25, 2000; later, in May 2002, it joined the MAP.

<sup>11</sup> The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council met December 19, 2001. Now 19 partners participated in the PARP. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan followed Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

<sup>12</sup> PFP partners Austria, Finland, and Sweden; MAP member Albania; and NATO invitees Bulgaria and Romania participated in the International Security Assistance Force.

<sup>13</sup> Central Asian partners Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; Black Sea partners Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine; and MAP invitee Slovakia, with new members Poland and the Czech Republic, participated in Operation *Enduring Freedom*.

<sup>14</sup> Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, assisted Warsaw's orientation and force generation conferences; the NATO School at Oberammergau helped train the multinational staff; Allied Forces, Southern Europe, supported the Warsaw planning staff on logistics planning; NATO assisted the Poles to establish a secure satellite communications link and provided intelligence sharing and information management. NATO Press Release (2003) 093, September 3, 2003; accessed at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-093e.htm>>.

<sup>15</sup> MAP member Macedonia; MAP invitees Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia; Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine on the Black Sea; Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus; and Kazakhstan in Central Asia participated in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.

<sup>16</sup> Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government of the Atlantic Council in Prague on November 21, 2002. NATO Press Release (2002) 127, November 21, 2002; accessed at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>>.

<sup>17</sup> See paragraphs 16.1 through 16.5. Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, November 22, 2002. This initiative called

on partners to intensify political consultations and information sharing on armaments and civil emergency planning; enhance preparedness for combating terrorism by security sector reforms and force planning, air defense and air traffic management, and armaments and logistics cooperation; impede support for terrorist groups by enhancing exchange of banking information and improving border controls of arms ranging from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to small arms and light weapons; enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence management of WMD-related terrorism and civil emergency planning; and provide assistance to partner efforts against terrorism through the Political Military Steering Committee Clearing House mechanism and creation of a PFP Trust Fund.

<sup>18</sup> In terms of criteria for NATO membership as outlined in the 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement*.

<sup>19</sup> For example, Austria, Finland, and Sweden participated in Bosnia–IFOR, to be joined later by Ireland in SFOR. All five participate in KFOR. Only Finland, Sweden, and Austria have engaged in ISAF, and none in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.

<sup>20</sup> Both joined in February 1994 and November 1995 respectively; Croatia only joined the Partnership for Peace in May 2000 and the MAP in February 2002.

<sup>21</sup> The *regatta concept* entails extending an invitation *contingent* upon completion of specific predetermined *acquis*. If multiple invitations are extended, actual accession dates could likely vary.

<sup>22</sup> SEDM members include Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey (with the United States, Italy, and more recently Ukraine as observers). Croatia joined SEDM in October 2000.

<sup>23</sup> Launched in December 1996, the United States initiated and supported the SECI to encourage cooperation among the states of Southeastern Europe on economic, transportation, and environmental matters as a way to facilitate their access to European integration. The SECI Center in Bucharest supports common transborder crime fighting efforts of participating countries. SECI presently includes all 10 Balkan countries from Slovenia to Turkey plus Hungary and Moldova.


<sup>24</sup> Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

<sup>25</sup> For over a decade, the United States has been working closely with Georgia (and Uzbekistan in Central Asia) on training forces to deal with their internal requirements.

<sup>26</sup> Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, M-DPC-2 (2000) 107, May 11, 2000.

<sup>27</sup> Under the heading of Crisis Response Operations in the NATO military budget and NATO Security Investment Program, NATO is already spending NSIP funds in Afghanistan and is about to spend even more in the operation of Kabul Airport.

<sup>28</sup> PFP "drift" has resulted in part from the restructuring of the international staff. The partnership is now subordinate to two Assistant Secretary Generals—to the Political Affairs Security Policy Division and the Defense Policy and Planning Division.

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